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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












JAMES WYNDER, JR., Superintendent; 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE 
COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-04396) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2010 
_______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 










Petitioner-Appellant Clarence Johnson appeals the District Court‟s decision 
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction.  For the 
reasons that follow we conclude that Johnson should be permitted to file a second habeas 
petition, and therefore remand for further proceedings.   
I. Background  
This appeal stems from a 1988 Pennsylvania jury trial, in which Johnson was 
found guilty of having arranged the murder of John Philson, a doorman/lookout at an 
illegal lottery house.  Following that trial, Johnson was found guilty of first degree 
murder, criminal conspiracy, and violation of the Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations 
Act (“PACOA”).  He was sentenced to life in prison on the murder charge, and 
concurrent sentences of five to ten years‟ imprisonment for each of the other charges.  Of 
relevance to this appeal, the PACOA charge related solely to the operation of the lottery 
house, which was undisputedly an illegitimate enterprise. 
Johnson unsuccessfully appealed his conviction, which became final on June 1, 
1993.  Johnson then filed a petition under Pennsylvania‟s Post Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”) in July 1993.  That petition was denied in January 1997, and Johnson‟s appeal 
from that denial to the Pennsylvania Superior Court was rejected in March 1998.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused further review. 
While the PCRA petition was pending, several relevant changes in the law took 
place.  First, in 1995 Pennsylvania amended the PCRA to require that petitions under that 
statute be filed within the later of one year after the date a relevant conviction becomes 
final, or 60 days after particular triggering events (such as the discovery of new facts or 
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the announcement of a new, and retroactive, constitutional right).  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 9545(b)(1)-(2).  Second,  in Commonwealth v. Besch, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that the PACOA “does not encompass the prosecution of a wholly 
illegitimate enterprise,” such as the illegal drug ring at issue in that case.   544 A.2d 655, 
661 (1996).   
In June 1999, Johnson filed his first federal habeas petition in the District Court.  
It raised a variety of claims, but did not argue that his PACOA conviction was improper 
under Besch.  The petition was denied with prejudice in February 2000, and our Court 
then declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
1
   
In August 2004, Johnson filed a second PCRA petition in Pennsylvania state court.  
It argued that, under Besch, Johnson‟s PACOA conviction was wrongful.  The Court of 
Common Pleas rejected Johnson‟s PCRA petition as untimely in 2006.  The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court echoed that conclusion on appeal, though it also noted that the substance 
of the petition was “unquestionably meritorious.”   
In October 2006, Johnson filed another habeas petition with the District Court, in 
which he argued that his PACOA conviction violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution because he was actually innocent of that 
offense.  However, Johnson did so without seeking authorization from our Court.  The 
District Court therefore concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
Johnson‟s “second or successive” petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).   
                                              
1
 Johnson later moved in our Court for authorization to file a successive habeas petition, 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), but we refused authorization in April 2002. 
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In August 2007, we granted Johnson a certificate of appealability, and in 
September 2009 specified two issues to be briefed:  1) whether Johnson needed prior 
authorization to file his successive petition; and 2) whether his actual innocence claim 
ripened after Besch was decided in 1996 or whether it did not ripen until February 2007, 
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Kendrick v. Dist. Att’y of Phila. Cty., 916 
A.2d 529, 541 (Pa. 2007), that Besch did not establish a new rule of law, and therefore 
applied retroactively.  
II. Discussion 
Johnson‟s appointed counsel states that Johnson was “required to apply to [our] 
Court to obtain permission to file a second or successive habeas petition” under 28 
U.S.C. §2244(b)(2), but that he failed to do so.  However, we do not find the issue to be 
so clear.  As the Commonwealth‟s counsel notes (with a candor we much appreciate), a 
subsequent habeas petition may not constitute a “second or successive” petition for 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) when it raises an issue that was not yet ripe when the 
first petition was filed.  Plainly, this exception implicates the second question posed in 
our certificate of appealability—whether Johnson‟s PACOA claim ripened when Besch 
was decided in 1996, or when Kendrik was decided in 2007.  Accordingly, we will first 
address whether there is a ripeness exception to the requirements of § 2244(b), and then 
whether this case satisfies the requirements of that exception. 
 In Panetti v. Quarterman, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
application of § 2244(b) to a prisoner‟s claim, advanced for the first time in a second 
habeas petition, that he was mentally incompetent to be executed under Ford v. 
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Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  551 U.S. 930, 938 (2007).  The Court held that 
Panetti‟s petition was not “second or successive” for purposes of § 2244(b) because his 
Ford claim was not yet ripe when he filed his earlier habeas petition.  Id. at 947.  Thus, it 
refused to force prisoners to pursue the “empty formality” of filing unripe Ford claims 
with their first habeas petitions, reasoning that such a practice would “not conserve 
judicial resources, „reduc[e] peacemeal litigation,‟ or „streamlin[e] federal habeas 
proceedings.‟”  Id. at 946 (citing Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 154 (2007)).   
We see no reason to avoid applying Panetti in the context of other types of claims 
that ripen only after an initial federal habeas petition has been filed.  However, for the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that Johnson‟s PACOA claim was ripe when he filed his 
first federal habeas petition in June 1999.   
At the outset, we note that, under Pennsylvania law as it stood in June 1999, it 
would have been difficult or impossible for Johnson to demonstrate his actual innocence 
of the PACOA charge.
2
  However, that a legal argument is unlikely to succeed, or is even 
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 Soon after Besch was filed, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the PACOA to make 
clear that it applied to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.  Kendrick, 916 A.2d at 
534.  Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied that amendment retroactively, 
holding that its effect had been to clarify that Besch had been incorrect all along.  Id. at 
535 (citing Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 696 A.2d 179, 186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (Shaffer 
I)).  That was the state of the law until July 1999, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reversed Shaffer I, holding that the legislative amendment to the PACOA applied only 
prospectively.  Shaffer, 734 A.2d at 843-44 (Shaffer II).  Further, though the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shaffer II ultimately applied Besch retroactively, see 
Shaffer I, 696 A.2d at 180-81 (indicating that events that led to the conviction at issue in 
Shaffer occurred prior to 1996), it was not until Kendrick that it was clear that Besch 
simply clarified the meaning of the PACOA as initially drafted rather than stating a new 
rule of law.  916 A.2d at 535.  Thus, when Johnson filed his federal habeas petition in 
June 1999, he may have been unable to demonstrate that the PACOA had been applied to 
6 
 
futile, does not make it unripe.  See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005) 
(noting that, if granted, a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion based on “a purported change in 
the substantive law governing the claim” would improperly circumvent § 2244(b)‟s 
requirement that successive claims be “precertified by the court of appeals”).  In that 
regard, we note that Kendrick itself arose in the context of a federal habeas petition in 
which the petitioner argued that Besch should be applied retroactively.  In response to 
that argument, we certified the Besch retroactivity question to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, but we did not dismiss the petition as unripe.  916 A.2d at 531.  Accordingly, we 
agree with the District Court that Johnson‟s 2006 habeas petition was a “second or 
successive” petition within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), and therefore Johnson 
was required to seek leave from our Court before proceeding with that petition.
3
   
However, we think that Johnson has met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2)(B), and thus is entitled to file a second habeas petition raising his PACOA 
claim.  As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized, Johnson‟s claim that he was 
wrongfully convicted under the PACOA is “unquestionably meritorious.”  Further, the 
United States Supreme Court has held under similar factual circumstances that it is 
inconsistent with the Federal Due Process Clause for Pennsylvania to “convict [someone] 
for conduct that its criminal statute, as properly interpreted, does not prohibit.”  Fiore v. 
                                                                                                                                                  
him improperly.   
 
3
 Anticipating that conclusion, Johnson argues that instead of dismissing his petition, the 
District Court was required to transfer it to this Court so that we could construe it as a 
motion to file a second or successive habeas petition and then rule on that motion.  
However, that question was not included in our certificate of appealability, and, in any 
event, it is not necessary to reach that issue. 
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White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001) (observing that “conviction and continued 
incarceration” based on Pennsylvania courts‟ earlier misinterpretation of a criminal 
statute violated due process).  Notably, Pennsylvania does not appear to disagree with 
this conclusion, as it has stated in its brief to our Court that “the Commonwealth would 
likely be amenable to a conditional grant of habeas relief, intended to vacate Johnson‟s 
conviction under the PACOA.”  Br. of Appellees at 27-28. 
Accordingly, we hereby grant Johnson permission to proceed with his second 
habeas petition in the District Court and remand for further proceedings.  In that regard, 
we note our decision in McKeever v. Warden, SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 
2007)—another case involving an improper conviction under the PACOA as interpreted 
in Besch—in which we affirmed the District Court‟s decision to grant a writ of habeas 
corpus and then stay the grant for a period of 180 days so that the Commonwealth courts 
could vacate the PACOA conviction and resentence the defendant.  Id. at 83. 
*   *   *   *   * 
Accordingly, we vacate and remand so that Johnson may pursue his second federal 
habeas petition. 
